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COMMENTS
Community Antenna Television and the Law
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The cable television industry started in 1948 in the hills of Penn-
sylvania and Oregon. This method of distributing television signals
through a wire, rather than broadcasting those signals through the air,
was first introduced in remote, mountainous areas where "over-the-air"
broadcast TV reception was poor. Over twenty years ago, private en-
treprenuers put TV antennas on mountain tops where they could pick
up signals from distant stations. Coaxial cable was strung on poles
from the antenna tower into towns, and individual homes were con-
nected to this 'trunk' line, thus producing a system basically similar to
the designs of telephone, gas, water, and power systems.'
Those who subscribed to this service paid a one-time installation fee
and a monthly service charge. This rate and fee structure was similar
to that of utility companies; thus, Community Antenna Television
(hereinafter referred to as CATV) was born.2
It was soon discovered that the quality of picture transmission was
far superior to the same pictures received by off-the-air television sets
closer to the point of origination. Additionally, cable subscribers could
receive programs from distant stations. This better quality of reception
results because cable signals are carried through insulated cables rather
than broadcast over the air. Broadcast signals in close proximity can
and frequently do interfere with each other.
3
Additional channels are available because cable can use frequencies
that broadcast television cannot use. Since signals on cable do not ra-
diate into the air, cable can use all of the frequency spectrum, limited
only by financial considerations.'
The signals go through the cable and can be received only where the
actual cable goes. Therefore, the order in which franchises are
awarded in each city, the order in which the franchise elects to install
1. Tate, Back to Basics, 4 CABLELINES 7, 8 (1976).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 23. This means that because cable does not project over the air waves, it is not
subject to regulation and can thus use as many locations from one end of the band (channel) to the
other, as their finances will permit. The term "frequency spectrum" refers to the channel band on
radios and television.
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the lines within each part of the city, and the rate of cable plant con-
struction determine who the consumers will be.' Cable's. potential for
.channel capacity and its ability to select its viewer population are two
of the basic qualities that make the industry so attractive as vehicles of
community communication.
Though growing fast, the cable industry remains in the budding
stage of its development. After regulation and deregulation, the only
hope left for public access is re-regulation, and the public access cable
is very ripe for re-regulation.
As public interest grows and activates its strengths, the courts will be
confronted repeatedly with requests for the establishment and enforce-
ment of cable's rights. By virtue of its youthful thirty-two years, both
case law and research resources regarding the cable industry are certain
to flourish.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
"A cable television signal receives off-the-air broadcast signals and
feeds them through amplifiers and cables to its subscribers".6
I
At4
5. Id. at 8.
6. Id. at 7.
7. Copper or copper sheathed aluminum wire surrounded by an insulating layer of foam.
The insulating layer of foam is covered with either braided copper wire or an aluminum sheath
and a protective outer skin. The wire and sheath react electronically with each other and set up an
electromagnetic field between them. This field reduces frequency loss and thus gives cable its
great signal carrying capacity. Id.
8. Local programming originating from the cable station itself.
9. Tate, supra note 1, at 8.
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The headend transmits the television signals carried in the distribu-
tion plant to the viewers' homes. The distribution plant, as mentioned,
includes the coaxial cable trunk and feeder lines. When an individual
subscribes to cable service, his television set is connected by a drop line
that simply taps into the trunk and feeder lines to draw off the televi-
sion signals that are being carried.'I
III. FCC AUTHORITY: ORIGINATION
The Communications Act of 1934," in creating the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (hereinafter referred to as the FCC), declared
that its primary objective should be to make available to the people of
the United States an efficient and reasonably priced service that would
provide rapid worldwide communication. 12 It was upon this rock that
the Federal Communications Commission built its authority to regu-
late the cable television industry.
IV. COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT/JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
"The FCC was first asked to assert jurisdiction over cable television
in 1954 when a small West Virginia broadcast station complained that
a community antenna television system intruded into its viewer market
and refused to carry the local station's signal."' 3 The FCC declined to
act on the grounds that cable systems were neither common carriers nor
broadcasters and were thus not subject to their jurisdiction."
A few years later, however, the FCC did begin to assert its authority
over community antenna television systems through its power to regu-
late microwave systems.' 5 This indirect regulation was effected
through the FCC's refusal to license microwave operators until the
cable systems they served agreed to certain restrictions.6
This indirect method of regulation surfaced in Carter Mountain
10. Id.
11. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
12. D. LE Duc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC (1973).
13. Note, Cable Television., The Practical Implications of Local Regulation and Control, 27
DRAKE L. REV. 391, 393 (1976).
14. Id. "Common carriers" and "broadcasters" refer to presently existing mediums of com-
munication such as radio and television.
15. Id. This is a method of transmitting closed circuit television signals through the air on a
highly directional, line-of-sight system from the originating station to one or more receiving sta-
tions.
16. Id. The FCC required the petitioner to refile its application when it could show that the
community antenna systems would carry the signal of the local outlet (intervenor) and would not
duplicate its programming. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
3
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Transmission Corp. v. FCC.7 There the FCC denied the application of
the plaintiff, a common carrier by radio, to construct a microwave radio
communication system to transmit signals (received from broadcast
television systems located in distant cities) to community antenna sys-
tems established in small Wyoming towns. The Commission found
that granting this license would result in the demise of an existing
broadcast station which could result in loss of service to a substantial
rural population not served by the proposed community antenna sta-
tion. This rationale resurfaces in the struggle for the expansion of the
cable industry for years to come. 18 The court held that the FCC, by
authority of the Communications Act of 1934, could weigh the net ef-
fect on the community to be served in fulfilling its duty to distribute
licenses. 19
The next cable-related litigation of significance appeared two years
later between two private parties. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc. 20
was a suit to establish the right of community antenna systems to com-
pete with existing broadcast stations.
Originally, the CATV station sued the broadcast station (KUTV) for
an antitrust violation. KUTV counterclaimed alleging that it had ex-
clusive rights to the programs in question by virtue of a contract. Fur-
ther, KUTV claimed that the activities of the cable station "constituted
tortious interference with those contractual rights and unfair competi-
tion in that the community antenna receives identical programs broad-
cast by other distant stations and distributes them for profit
simultaneously with the KLIX airings."'" The court held for the cable
franchise, stating that unless the broadcast station could demonstrate a
protected interest by virtue of an infringement of copyright laws, or in
some other manner bring themselves within another recognized excep-
tion to the policy of promoting free access to matters in the public do-
main, they could not prevail against a CATV system for unfair
competition in the reception and distribution of programs from distant
stations.22 The court also rejected defendant's claim that plaintiff had
tortiously interferred with their constitutional right to contract.23 This
17. Id.
18. Broadcast stations are a part of an advertiser-supported medium. Cable cast stations are
subscriber supported. An example of this rationale is found in Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc.,
335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964) where the broadcast station challenged the right of the cable station
to compete with it. Substantially the same issue arose in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157 (1968).
19. 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
20. 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
21. Id. at 349.
22. Id. at 354.
23. In rejecting this claim the Court noted that public policy allows free access to copy
4
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new judicial precedent opened doors for franchises everywhere. The
establishment of this basic right to compete marked an important mile-.stone in the infant industry's budding growth.
On April 22, 1965 the FCC asserted jurisdiction over microwave-fed
CATV24 in its First Report and Order." The report and order required
the carriage26 of local broadcast station signals by cable systems receiv-
ing microwave service within the service area of the broadcast station.
The CATV systems would not have to carry such signals if not re-
quested by the local station, if the signal "substantially duplicated net-
work programming of a higher grade signal,27 and if carrying the signal
would, because of limited channel capacity, prevent the system from





The second portion of the First Report and Order dealt with
nonduplication. 29 This portion prevented CATV systems from show-
ing the same picture that the local broadcast station showed for a
period of fifteen days following the showing by the local broadcast sta-
tion. 3° This signified efforts to help cable stations and local broadcast
stations coexist peacefully in a nonthreatening manner.
One year later, in its Second Report and Order,3 the FCC asserted
jurisdiction over all CATV systems. There the rule prohibiting cable
transmission of any show carried by the local station for a period of
fifteen days before and after its showing was relaxed, and the period of
required "non-duplication" was shortened from fifteen days to one
broadcast day before and after. The carriage provisions were not sub-
ject to waiver, but certain cable systems were exempted from the re-
quirement. Regarding educational TV, the FCC required that cable
stations give "local and area ETV stations advance notice of CATV
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain. "The general rule of
law is that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and
ideas-become after voluntary communications to others, free as the air to common use. Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandies, J., dissenting)." Id at
351.
24. C. TATE, CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES 114 (1971).
25. 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
26. "Carriage" is the transmission of the signal over their wires.
27. This means that if the local station puts out a signal sufficiently strong, not requiring the
usually superior reception of the cable station, then the cable station is not required to transmit the
signal of the local station.
28. M. SEIDEL, CATV USA 86 (1972).
29. Nonduplication is aimed at preserving the local station's exclusivity as an outlet for the
programs it has obtained the right to exhibit in the competitive program market. Nonduplication
is restricted to the area in which the station acts as the exclusive outlet for its programming. 38
F.C.C. 683 (1965).
30. Id. at 87.
31. 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). In part, the FCC reached an initial conclusion that it has jurisdic-
tion over all community antenna television systems, whether or not microwave facilities are used.
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proposals to bring in distant ETV signals."3 This relaxed attitude can
be attributed to the lower degree of competition in the educational tele-
vision market.33
The newest and most significant aspect of this Second Report, was
the promulgation of the Major Market Distant Signal Policy.34 This
policy "prohibited cable systems from bringing distant signals into the
100 major television markets without hearings on the probable effect on
local broadcasting."35 Based on economic impact and fair competition
grounds, the enforcement of this policy forced the cable industry to
stick to its original claims that a substantial void would be filled by the
introduction of cable systems into areas where a minimum variety of
shows are presently available. 36 This amounted to another way of en-
suring local broadcast stations of some protection of their existing mar-
kets.3 7 Consequently, cable television surged in rural areas.
On June 17, 1968 the Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether the FCC had authority to order a cable franchise to restrict
their carriage of signals into certain areas pending hearings to deter-
mine whether the carriage of such signals contravened the public inter-
est.3 8 Midwest Television, a broadcast station, brought suit against
Southwestern Cable Company, claiming that the latter's importation of
Los Angeles signals had fragmented the San Diego audience. Midwest
claimed that this reduced the advertising revenues of local stations and
ultimately caused the termination of services provided by local broad-
casting stations.39  While investigating this claim, the FCC ordered
32. M. SEIDEL, supra note 28, at 91.
33. Other than educational interests, most of those presenting evidence on this subject were
against extending any nonduplication protection to ETV, for the asserted reason that the widest
possible dissemination of educational material is in the public interest. They further asserted that
Community Antenna Television [hereinafter cited as CATV] competition has no economic impact
on Educational Television [hereinafter cited as ETV] because it operates on a nonprofit basis. 2
F.C.C.2d at 760.
34. The most unique feature of the Second Report and Order on CATV was based on the
same central grounds as those of the First Report and Order: "(1) economic impact based on
CATV and UHF trends, and (2) a fair competition ground based on the . . . conditions under
which the broadcasting and CATV industries compete." M. SEIDEL, supra note 28, at 91.
35. NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INC., CABLE TELEVISION IN
NORTH CAROLINA 7 (1978).
36. Because signals are prohibited in the urban areas, expanding franchises were "forced" to
engulf rural areas. This indirectly "forced" the cable industry into fulfilling its original promise of
making a variety of shows available to an otherwise lacking rural audience. M. SEIDEL, supra
note 28, at 91.
37. The effect of this policy on cable expansion in rural areas left the urban areas, tempora-
rily free from cable intervenors, to the thriving broadcasters. Id.
38. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
39. Id. at 160 n.4. Midwest averred that respondent's CATV systems transmitted the signals
of Los Angeles broadcasting stations into the San Diego area, and thereby had, inconsistent with
the public interest, adversely affected Midwest's San Diego station.
6
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Southwestern to freeze its subscriber population in the disputed area.
Southwestern in turn claimed that the FCC was exceeding its authority.
The Court found that "there [was] substantial evidence that the
Commission cannot 'discharge its overall responsibilities without au-
thority over this important aspect of television service.' "4 The mis-
conception communicated here is that the phrase "contravened the
public interest" really means "contravened the economic interests of
the existing local broadcast stations.
4 1
This is not a bad decision inasmuch as it temporarily freezes expan-
sion. This freeze can be traced to the problems of attempting to regu-
late an industry when the precise role of the industry is unknown.
The FCC found that sometimes the "public interest" demands "in-
terim relief' in areas where its generalized regulations are inadequate.
Limiting further expansion pending hearings to determine appropriate
actiors is such an instance. 42 "This Court has recognized that 'the ad-
ministrative process [must] possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself
to the 'dynamic aspects of radio transmission.' ",43 The decision in
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. shows a broadening of FCC
regulation of the cable industry. This broadening, however, promotes
again the interests of the television industry as opposed to the interests
of the public. This is a trend that continued until the 1976 Report and
Order of the FCC.4 4
CATV systems carry motion picture programming received from
broadcast stations. These broadcast stations must purchase licenses
from the copyright holders of the motion pictures shown. In Fortnighty
Corporation v. United Artists Television, Inc. ,4 1 the United States
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether CATV systems were violat-
ing the Copyright Act of 190946 by infringing on the exclusive perform-
ance rights of the broadcast stations.
The function that CATV plays in the total process of television
broadcasting and reception was the determinant factor. The Court
40. Id. at 177.
41. The real problem is revealed in 392 U.S, at 160 n.4: "Midwest asserted that respondent's
importation of Los Angeles signals had fragmented the San Diego audience, that this would re-
duce the advertising revenues of local stations, and that the ultimate consequence would be to
terminate or to curtail the services provided . . . by local broadcast stations."
42. The Commission has acknowledged:
[ln this area of rapid and significant change, there may be situations in which its generalized
regulations are inadequate, and special or additional forms of relief are imperative. It has
found that the present case may prove to be such a situation, and that the public interest
demands 'interim relief. . . limiting further expansion,' pending hearings to determine ap-
propriate Commission Action. Such orders do not exceed the Commission's authority.
Id. at 180.
43. Id.
44. 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
45. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
46. Ch. 320, § I, 35 Stat. 1075.
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held that CATV operators, like viewers, but unlike broadcasters, do
not, under the Copyright Act of 1909, "perform" the programs that
they receive and carry, and hence do not infringe the latter's exclusive
performance rights under the Act.4 7 It appears that this only applies to
"retransmitted" broadcasts, specifically excluding "original program-
ming." The removal of this potentially stymying economic burden pro-
moted a new sense of freedom in the growth of the cable industry.
In June of 1968 the FCC ruled that Section 214 of the Communica-
tions Act 48 required telephone companies to obtain FCC approval
prior to constructing or extending CATV lines. On October 27, 1969
the United States Supreme Court upheld the FCC's right to require this
approval.4 9
TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor5" upheld a Nevada law giving the Nevada
Public Service Commission authority to regulate cable TV. The
United States District Court of Nevada found that "the apparatus of
such a system was an appendage to interstate broadcasting facilities
with incidents much more local than national, involving cable equip-
ment through public streets, local franchises, local intrastate advertis-
ing and selling of services, and local intrastate collections, so that in
this perspective, the system was essentially a local business of which
state regulation, in the absence of federal legislative intervention, did
not constitute a burden on interstate commerce." 5 ' This marked the
first judicial sanction of state regulation. Note, however, the federal
preemption reservations.52
On October 20, 1969, the FCC required cable systems with more
than 3,500 subscribers to originate programming by April 1, 1977. On
the surface it appeared that this was a victory for the accommodation
of the public's interest. This order provided that CATV systems pro-
vide a public access channel. The rule, however, failed to specify that
those systems be required to originate locally produced programming.
One of the originally anticipated benefits of cable television was the
47. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
48. No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line . . . , or shall require or
operate any line, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transmission over or by means of
such additional or extended line, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from
the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity re-
quire or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and operation of such
additional or extended line ....
47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970).
49. Federal Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 369 U.S. 888 (1969).
50. 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968).
51. Id. at 463.
52. The court gave weight to the established rule that in the absence of congressional occupa-
tion of the field, state action is presumptively constitutional. It is settled that Congress, in enacting
the Federal Communications Act of 1934, did not intend absolute preemption of the field to the
exclusion of all state regulation. Id. at 464.
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opportunity for community expression. This expression was to include
areas of local interest, such as local news, local high school sports pro-
gramming, local weather information, etc. If federal regulation allows
the cable system operators to fulfill the requirement with foreign pro-
gramming, this benefit will never accrue to the local community. 3
Also, to lessen actual promotion of public interest, the system opera-
tors54 were given the power to make and enforce operational rules for
the public access channel. The FCC thereby failed to recognize that
public access would remain unresolved because full public access
would have been contrary to the economic interests of CATV opera-
tors.
This was the development and completion of the first phase of
CATV regulation. It was primarily for the convenience of the broad-
cast television industry. The rules, practically speaking, were designed
to limit cable's competitive impact on broadcast television.
In February of 1972 the FCC issued a Cable Television Report and
Order55 requiring that CATV systems must provide the following:
one dedicated, noncommercial public access channel, available without
charge at all times on a first-come, first-serve nondiscriminatory basis
and, without charge during a development period, one channel for edu-
cational use and another channel for local government use.56
In providing those channels, the cable operator was prohibited from
restricting content control over the materials,5 7 thereby forcing the op-
erators to relinquish their heretofore absolute authority to mold and
enforce operational rules governing the public access channel. These
rules became effective in March of 1972 and applied only to stations
within the top 100 television markets.58 This further reduced the
number of systems actually affected by the order. There were also
waiver provisions to accommodate stations that could not sustain the
burden of these requirements.5 9 With this perfect opportunity to inject
subjectivity, the number of affected systems could substantially plunge.
Noting that local governments were intricately involved due to the
use of their public rights of way and that local authorities were in a
53. To benefit the local community, the operators, in addition to retransmission of broadcast
stations signals, would have to "originate their own" cablecasts of local interest topics, i.e., high
school reports, community education, etc.
54. System operators are the owners of local cable franchises.
55. 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
56. Id. at 190.
57. Id. at 195.
58. "These access rules will be applicable to all new systems that become operational after
March 31, 1972 in the top 100 television markets. Currently operating systems in those markets
will have five years to comply with this section." Id.
59. "If these requirements should impose an undue burden on some isolated system, that is a
matter to be dealt with in a waiver request, with an appropriate detailed showing." Id. at 197.
9
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better position to follow up on subscriber complaints,6" the FCC con-
cluded that the industry was "uniquely suited to a type of federalism
that encompassed a deliberately structured dualism."'" The FCC cited
their responsibility to establish "minimum standards for franchises is-
sued by local authorities" to assure fulfillment of their obligation to
insure efficient communication service with adequate facilities at rea-
sonable rates.62
The FCC felt that CATV systems were generally unable to respond
to local interests because they imported long distance signals. Another
difference between cablecast and broadcast stations was that the latter
had to pay for the production of its programming. These differences
contributed to the slow development of public access as it took a back
seat to the protection and promotion of broadcast stations and their
economic interests.63
In 1972, the Supreme Court in United States v. Midwest Video Corpo-
ration (hereinafter referred to as Midwest J),64 was required to deter-
mine whether the FCC's program orientation rule was "reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of its various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting. ' 65 The rule communicated
the requirement that "no community antenna system having 3,500 or
more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast sta-
tion unless the cable system also operates to a significant extent as a
local outlet by cablecasting, 66 and has available facilities for local pro-
duction and presentation of programs other than automated serv-
"167ices.
The plurality found this First Report and Order ruling to promote
the public interest within the meaning of the Communications Act of
60. The comments advance persuasive arguments for federal licensing:
We agree the conventional licensing would place an unmanageable burden on the Commis-
sion. Moreover, local governments are inescapably involved in the process because cable
makes use of streets and ways and because local authorities are able to bring a special expert-
ness to such matters, for example, as how best to parcel large urban areas into cable districts.
Local authorities are also in a better position to follow up on service complaints.
Id.
61. Id. at 207.
62. The Commission was persuaded that because of the limited resources of states and mu-
nicipalities and its own obligations to insure an efficient communications service with adequate
facilities at resonable charges, they must set at least minimum standards for franchises issued by
local authorities. Id.
63. "If these requirements should impose an undue burden on some isolated system, that is a
matter to be dealt with in a waiver request, with an appropriate detailed showing." Id. at 197.
64. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
65. Id. at 663.
66. This is a means of increasing the number of local outlets for community self expression
and for augmenting of the public's choice of programs and types of services without the use of
broadcast spectrum.
67. 406 U.S. at 649.
10
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1934.68 The Chief Justice in Midwest I concluded that "until Congress
acts to deal with the problems brought about by the emergence of
CATV, the FCC should be allowed wide latitude."69 In so holding, the
Court affirmed the FCC's rejection of "the contention that a prohibi-
tion on CATV originations was necessary to prevent potential fraction-
alization of the audience for broadcast services and a siphoning off of
program cast service," and further held that "[b]roadcasters and CATV
originators stand on the same footing in acquiring the program mate-
rial with which they compete."7 Moreover, "a loss of audience or ad-
vertising revenue to a television station is not in itself a matter of
moment to the public interest unless the result is a net loss of television
service."7"
For the first time the Court expressed a concern for the budding
cable industry that was not overshadowed with concern for preserving
the status quo of the broadcast industry. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals had based their contrary findings on the view that the record
did not support a finding that the origination rule furthered the public
interest72 because the regulation, in their view, created "the risk that
the added burden of cablecasting would result in increased subscription
rates and even the termination of CATV services."73 The Supreme
Court found this reasoning to be grossly incorrect inasmuch as the reg-
ulation only applies to systems with more than 3,500 subscribers and
thus affects only thirty percent of the existing systems.74 Also the po-
tential burden is further lessened by the existence of waiver procedures
which apply even while requests for waivers are pending.75
68. "In the light of the record in this case, there is substantial evidence that the rule, with its
3,500 standard and as it is applied under FCC guidelines for waiver on a showing of financial
hardship, will promote the public interest within the meaning of the Communications Act of
1934." Id. at 650.
69. Id.
70. In so concluding, the FCC rejected the contention that a prohibition on CATV origina-
tions was "necessary to prevent potential fractionalization of the audience for broadcast services
and a siphoning off of program material and advertising revenue now available to the broadcast
service." 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
71. 406 U.S. at 655 n.10.
72. "The Commission report itself shows that upon the basis of the record made, it is highly
speculative whether there is sufficient expertise or information available to support a finding that
the origination rule will further the public interest." Id.
73. Id. at 671.
74. On this basis, the Commission chose to apply the regulation to systems with 3,500 or
more subscribers, effective January 1, 1971.
This standard [the Commission explained] appears more than reasonable in light of the
[data filed with] our decision to permit advertising at natural breaks . . . . and the one year
grace period. Moreover, it appears that approximately 70 percent of the systems now
originating have fewer than 3,500 subscribers; indeed, about half of the systems now originat-
ing have fewer than 2,000 subscribers.
Id.
75. Id. at 673.
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The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court pointed out that the
authority heretofore established through the courts concerned the re-
transmission of signals originating elsewhere, but that CATV systems
either supplement broadcasting by facilitating signal reception of local
stations or transmit signals of distant stations.16 They contrasted this
historical role of CATV with the requirements imposed by origination
which require new investments, new and different equipment, and ad-
ditional personnel. The dissent concluded by noting that "there is not
the slightest suggestion in the act or in its history that a carrier can be
bludgeoned into becoming a broadcaster while other broadcasters live
under more lenient rules."77 This is a very convincing point which the
plurality should have addressed.
The dissent makes a much more persuasive argument than does the
plurality. The Court, in effect, is ordering the cable systems to produce
on the same level as regular broadcast stations. This is clearly contrary
to the nature of the cable industry, which is primarily to "re-transmit"
and not to "produce." The additional costs this would involve could
quickly cause the demise of many cable operations. The Court seems
unable to accept one of the major differences between cable and broad-
cast systems-that cable operations do not require the expenses of pro-
duction as do broadcast stations. The Court seems determined to
equalize the costs. Also, this ruling would result in strict governmental
control over the cable industry, unheard of in the longstanding broad-
cast industry.78
Superficially, at this point it appears that the FCC is working hard to
ensure effective public access programming. A deeper look, however,
reveals that only the bare bones of public access are provided. "If in-
terested parties do not press to realize the potential of access program-
ming through hard work. . . .then other pressures, lack of interest, or
ignorance will make public access ineffectual and unimportant. 79
The Rand Corporation report discussed the four major problems
raised by the FCC rules for new systems in the top 100 markets:
1. Cable operators are required to maintain production facilities
76. Id. at 677.
77. Id. at 680.
78. The plurality opinion performs the legerdemain by saying that the requirement of
CATV origination is 'reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's power to regulate television
broadcasting. That requires a brand-new amendment to the broadcasting provisions of the
Act, which only the Congress can effect. The Commission is not given carte blanche to initi-
ate broadcasting stations; it cannot force people into the business. It cannot say to one who
applies for a broadcast outlet in city A that the need is greater in city B and he will be
licensed there. The fact that the Commission has authority to regulate origination of pro-
grams if CATV decides to enter the field does not mean that it can compel CATV to originate
programs.
Id.
79. R. KLETrER, CATV: MAKING PUBLIC AcCEss EFFECTIVE 9 (1973).
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within the franchised area for access use, including [five] minutes
live time free. However, only minimal equipment for example,
only one studio camera need be available, thus severely limiting
effective programming.
2. With only one channel for public access, regular scheduling of pro-
grams or awarding of choice time slots becomes difficult.
3. By requiring systems with more than 3500 subscribers to originate
substantial amounts of local programming, the FCC may be invit-
ing conflict between cable origination and public access or commu-
nity origination.
4. Funding: the FCC has left the financial problems of access up to
each community and restricted the financial burden a community
can impose on a cable operator through franchise fees and the like.
The FCC also prohibits mandatory subsidy of access by the opera-
tor.
The requirements for access channels should not be confused with
those for local origination. A cable system may have over 3500
subscribers but not be in the top 100 markets.
In that case it must originate programming but does not have to
provide access channels. The local franchising authority can de-
mand that it do so, however. While major market urban systems
will undoubtedly have over 3500 subscribers, some major market
suburbs may not have enough subscribers to require local origina-
80tion.
May of 1976 brought its Third Report and Order8 ' in which the FCC
pondered whether to discontinue their practice of requiring that sepa-
rate access channels be provided to each community served. The FCC
decided to keep the four designated access channels requirement for
systems with 3,500 or more subscribers which have sufficient channel
capacity without installing converters. 82 Systems having adequate ac-
cess capacity and less than 3,500 subscribers may use one designated
access channel for shared use among public, educational, government,
and leased users if such a system's activated channel capacity is suffi-
cient to provide such channel.
8 3
80. Id. at 910.
81. 59 F.C.C. 2d 294, 313 (1976).
82. We have, accordingly, modified our rules in several major respects. First, while we
shall maintain our commitment to the provisions of four specially designated access channels,
we have modified this requirement to make clear that (a) it will only apply to those systems
with 3,500 or more subscribers which have sufficient channel capability without installing
convertors, to provide such multiple channels. -
Id. at 314.
83. Second, in view of our belief that in the majority of cases, all access needs can be met
by the provision of one access channel for composite access programming, we have deter-
mined to modify our rules to require that cable television systems with 3,500 subscribers or
more to provide at least one designated access channel for shared use among public, educa-
tional, local government and leased users, if such a systems activated channel capability is
sufficient to provide such channel.
Id.
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New regulation section 76-256, regarding access service equipment
requirements, provides that each system having more than 3,500 sub-
scribers shall have available equipment for local production and pre-
sentation of cablecast programs84 and permit its use for the production
and presentation of public access programs. 85 Additionally, it requires
that no such system can contract away its time and thus inhibit the use
of that equipment for a substantial portion of time for public access
16programming.
Then came the hardest judicial blow to public access. In Midwest
Video Corporation v. FCC (hereinafter referred to as Midwest I), 87 the
court held that the FCC's mandatory channel capacity, equipment, and
access rules exceeded their jurisdiction.88 This court-imposed deregu-
lation marked a substantial setback to public access. The issue facing
the court was "whether compelling cable systems to build and dedicate
facilities to essentially free public use was within the FCC's jurisdic-
tion."89
The FCC said that because the United States Supreme Court (in a
split decision 4-1-4) allowed the mandatory origination rule in Midwest
I" as reasonably ancillary to their responsiblities for broadcast televi-
sion, that the Eighth Circuit should rubber stamp the Commission's
jurisdiction and their mandatory access rules. The FCC, however, had
told the Supreme Court that the origination rule was an attempt to re-
quire cable systems to meet some of the same basic standards of re-
sponsibility to the public that are imposed on broadcasters. 9 ' This was
a far cry from the FCC's 1976 Report and Order regulations that were
an attempt to require cable systems to meet standards of responsibility
to the public that cannot lawfully be imposed on broadcasters. 92 Thus,
the 1976 Report and Order Regulations are "necessarily divorced from,
rather than reasonably ancillary to, the FCC's regulation of broadcast-
ing."
93
84. Id. at 328.
85. These programs include local sports, town meetings, community affairs, weather, etc.
86. 59 F.C.C.2d at 328.
87. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1041.
90. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
91. Id. at 679.
92. Though the FCC tells us that Midwest Video legitimized its present common carrier type
access regulations, the FCC told the Supreme Court that the origination rule there involved was
an attempt to require cable systems "[tlo meet some of the same basic standards of responsibility
to the public that are imposed on broadcasters." 571 F.2d at 1052.
93. Id. Because the FCC's 1976 report regulations are an attempt to require cable systems to
meet "standards of responsibility to the public," they cannot lawfully be "imposed on broadcast-
ers;" and they are necessarily divorced from, rather than reasonably ancillary to, the FCC's regu-
lations of broadcasting.
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Cable operators felt that in many communities the channels and
equipment would go unused, while the cost would be passed on to sub-
scribers who may possibly be uninterested in viewing access pro-
grams.94 The court in Midwest II noted that "it would appear that
satisfaction of the FCC's desire to advance first amendment interests in
increased communication via its access concept can actually be assured
only by an Orwellian requirement that users must produce and cable
consumers must watch access programs."95
The Midwest II court rejected the mandatory access and equipment
regulations for several reasons. First, they exceeded the FCC's jurisdic-
tional statute. 96 The statute delegated regulatory authority over com-
mon carriers and broadcasters; cable systems are neither. "Hence the
Act contains no specific grant of authority over cable systems, and there
can have been no Congressional intent regarding them."97 Other rea-
sons are indicated in the court's findings that the regulations were not
proven to be "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's responsibilities, and
that the mere existence of valid objectives does not confer jurisdiction.
Had the FCC shown that the regulations in question were "reason-
ably ancillary," with some nexus to their actual statutory responsibility,
this case would not have come up. Because the free public access con-
cept has nothing to do with retransmission of broadcast signals on ex-
isting channels, the relationship between cable and broadcast systems
present in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. and Midwest I is
totally absent. "The present rules are not designed to require that cable
systems do what broadcasters do, but relate to cable systems alone, and
are designed to force them into unwanted activities having no bearing
on the health and welfare of broadcasting.
9 8
The court found that "each regulation of cable television must stand
or fall individually, not on legal precedent concerning other regula-
tions, but on whether or not the regulation under the review meets the
standard established by the Court." 99 -
The FCC stated that its objectives-(1) to make available to all citi-
zens a rapid, efficient, nation-wide wire and radio communication serv-
ice and (2) furthering the achievement of long-established regulatory
goals in the field of television broadcasting by increasing the number of
outlets for community self-expression-supported its jurisdiction be-
cause the Court "approved" them in Midwest I. ' The court in Mid-
94. Id. at 1032.
95. Id. at 1046.
96. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
97. 571 F.2d at 1036.
98. Id. at 1038.
99. Id. at 1039. --
100. Id. at 1040-41.
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west II, however, felt that every act of every government agency would
be justified, jurisdictionally sound, and judicially approved, if such
objectives were the sole criteria.
The court found strong constitutional grounds for setting these regu-
lations aside. "Government control of business operations must be
most closely scrutinized when it affects communication of information
and ideas, and prior restraints in those circumstances are presumptively
invalid."''
The FCC did not attempt to show that such regulation was necessary
to protect a clear public interest threatened by a clear and present dan-
ger. '0 ' Nor did they attempt to explain why cable systems are not enti-
tled to the same first amendment rights as newspapers, movies, etc.1
0 3
Nor did they offer proof that the regulations would result in quality,
effective local programming. 104
In Midwest II, Midwest Video claimed, and rightfully so, that the
rules at issue effect a taking of private property without just compensa-
tion while simultaneously denying system proprietors the chance to ne-
gotiate for the benefit of receiving a fair rate of return, in violation of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment.'
0 5
The court assumed that "no government agency has the fatal-to-free-
dom power to force a newspaper to add [twenty] pages to its publica-
tion, or to dedicate three pages to free, first-come-first-served access by
the public, educators, and government, or to lease the fourth page on
the same basis ... "06
It finally happened. The growing trend of regulation and expanding
opportunities for public access reached their peak having enjoyed only
thirteen short years of existence. The Third Report and Order' 017
marked the first step back down the ladder of success for the growth of
public access. Midwest II1°8 carried the weight down the next ten steps
of the ladder, leading the way to contraction of FCC authority.
In this second phase of regulation while public access had been dis-
101. Id. at 1053.
102. In wresting from cable operators the control of privately owned facilities for transmis-
sion of programs not acquired from public airwaves, the Commission makes no effort to show
the action to have been necessary to protect a 'clear public interest, threatened not too doubt-
fully or remotely, but by clear and present danger,' or to show 'the gravest abuses, endanger-
ing paramount interests [which would] give occasion or permissible limitation.'
Id. at 1053-54.
103. Id. at 1055.
104. Id. at 1059-60.
105. Midwest argued persuasively that the 1976 mandatory construction and access rules con-
stitute a taking of private property without just compensation and deny cable owners an opportu-
nity to earn a fair rate of return, in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
106. 571 F.2d at 1056.
107. 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
108. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).
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covered, its potential effectiveness had been thwarted by the the court's
shortsightedness in promoting the cable industry and not the interest of
the general public.
By the time public access became recognized as a legitimate interest,
the courts had greatly abused their jurisdictional discretion in further-
ance of the interests of the broadcast industry. 10 9
On September 29, 1978, the District of Columbia Circuit decided
Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC."I° This
case was very similar to Midwest HI. Instead of requiring the plaintiff
to originate community cablecasting, the FCC in this instance had re-
quired the plaintiff to "make audio recordings of all broadcasts in
which any issue of public importance is discussed.""' Plaintiffs, non-
commercial educational broadcast stations, challenged the regulation
on first and fifth amendment grounds, two of the strongest determining
factors in Midwest 11.112 The court held that the requirement "placed
substantial burdens on noncommercial educational broadcasters and
presented the risk of direct governmental interference in program con-
tent and, since no substantial government interest had been shown, was
unconstitutional under the first and fifth amendments."' '3
Less than one month later, the FCC, in a Memorandum Opinion and
Order, denied a private petitioner five free minutes of live public ac-
cess."I4 Because Midwest II t' was pending at the time, the FCC al-
leged enforcement of the old rules. The results, however, were
essentially the same. This was a strong indication of a permanent trend
toward the limitation of public access.
Ron Kurtenbach, petitioner in the Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, alleged that respondent, T.V. Transmissions, Inc., had ignored his
request for access. The respondent answered that the petitioner had
never submitted a written request. The petitioner additionally alleged
that the respondent had "conjured up controversial copyright issues as
a means of prohibiting free expression. ,,116 Regarding this con-
109. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
110. 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
111. Id. at 1103.
112. See text accompanying notes 102-07 supra.
113. 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
114. 69 F.C.C.2d 1624 (1978).
115. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).
116. (c) Cablevision has conjured up controversial copyright issues as a means of prohibit-
ing free expression on the non-live public access channel. The fact that Cablevision requires
access program producers to sign a waiver which relieves Cablevision of legal responsibility
for the program that is cablecast should obviate the need for such a stringent interpretation of
the copyright laws by Cablevision. Although petitioner has served on the Lincoln Cable
Television Advisory Board and has presented several prerecorded public access programs
over the Cablevision access channel, he had never seen a copy of the Cablevision operating
rules for access programming until they were submitted as an exhibit attached to an opposi-
tion pleading in this proceeding.
69 F.C.C.2d at 1625-26.
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tention, the FCC held that TV. Transmissions' request for copyright
clearances seemed to be a simple and effective solution to potential
copyright problems. Kurtenbach claimed that the reception of the
channel reserved for public usage was of a substantially poorer quality
than the reception available in the retransmission of regular broadcast
programs. At this point, the respondent revealed that programs sub-
mitted by the petitioner were obscene and indecent. The petitioner's
claim was too weak on its merits to win a victory for public access." 17
Citing Teleprompter of Worchester, Inc. v. FCC,"I the FCC ruled
that cable operators are not obligated to provide live cablecasting op-
portunities where taping facilities were made available to access
users. '' 9 The claimant there stated that he had never seen a copy of the
Cablevision operating rules for access programming prior to the suit,
which was met with a strong reminder by the court to the cable opera-
tors of their clear statutory obligations 20 to make such rules openly
available for public inspection.' 2' In reprimanding the cable operator,
the court gave new hope for the advancement of public access.
From its first assertion of direct jurisdiction in Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp. v. FCC,22 the FCC expanded its regulatory grasps
until Midwest 1123 in 1972, a mere nine year period. Repeatedly, the
FCC alleged that its jurisdiction was "necessary to regulate the com-
munication system in a manner designed to make available to all citi-
zens wire and radio communications service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges." Equally as many times the court, at one level or
117. Id. at 1625.
118. 67 F.C.C.2d 643 (1978).
119. 69 F.C.C.2d at 1627. The Commission determined that the rules do not impose upon
cable system operators a requirement to provide live cablecasting where taping facilities are made
available to access users by the cable operator.
120. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(a) (1978):
Equipment requirement. Each such system shall have available equipment for local produc-
tion and presentation of cablecast programs other than automated services and permit its use
for the production and presentation of public access programs. No such system shall enter
into any contract, arrangement, or lease for use of its cablecasting equipment which prevents
or inhibits the use of such equipment for a substantial portion of time for public access pro-
gramming.
47 C.F.R. § 76.305(b) (1978):
Location of records. The public inspection file shall be maintained at the office which the
cable television system maintains for the ordinary collection of subscriber charges, resolution
of subscriber complaints, and other business or at any accessible place in the cable system's
community (such as a public registry for documents or an attorney's office). The public in-
spection file shall be available for public inspection at any time during regular business hours.
121. "Finally, we remind Cablevision that its operating rules are required to be available for
public inspection. The public inspection file is to be available at either the system's office or
another accessible place in the community at any time during regular business hours." 69
F.C.C.2d at 1628.
122. 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
123. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
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another, upheld the claims of the FCC, finding them to be "reasonably
ancillary" to the statutory basis 24 upon which the FCC is based.'25
. It was not until the FCC began imposing double standards on cable-
cast stations, as contrasted to broadcast stations, 126 that the judiciary
was forced to withdraw its support. Public access thus was inadver-
tently sacrificed by an over-anxious yet well-meaning FCC. The con-
cept of public access somehow ran its course without any substantive
period of growth. The irony is both strong and unfortunate. Cable
television was originally conceived as a brilliant and infinite outlet for
community expression. The promise of public access is shown in an
excerpt from a portion of the Rand Corporation's extensive cable find-
ings:
Public access is one of cable television's most significant prospects.
With programming created by local citizens for local citizens, and
transmitted on cable channels dedicated for that special purpose, televi-
sion may finally discover local issues and culture. It may become com-
monplace to see ordinary people videotaping programs in their own
neighborhoods, bringing the problems and pleasures of local life to the
attention of their communities. This phenomenon could restore to the
television screen some qualities that have nearly been refined out of it:
spontaneity; originality; controversy; realism; even attractive amateur-
ishness. 1 27
V. CONCLUSION
At approximately the same time that the FCC found program origi-
nation by cable systems to be a good source of public expression, the
television broadcast industry, which was heretofore a strong advocate
of cable regulation because it was to their advantage, began advocating
the deregulation of the cable industry.
Originally, the regulation of cable television was based, all too often,
on vague notions of jurisdiction based on objectives and not on legiti-
mate jurisdictional grounds. The resulting confusion gave the apparent
(but false) impression that what cable needed was deregulation. To the
contrary, what cable needed and still needs is re-regulation. Re-regula-
tion should be based on public needs; re-regulation should be built on
legitimate jurisdictional grounds. What the cable industry needs is a
foundation built not upon supplementing the vast benefits of broadcast
124. 47 U.S.C. § 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)..
125. Cases where the FCC found their jurisdiction "reasonably ancillary" include Caner
Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963) and United States v. Mid-
west Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
126. In Midwest I, the Commission required cable operators to originate programming and to
provide equipment. Requirements of this nature have yet to be imposed on broadcast stations.
127. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
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television, but upon the promotion of public access as expressed in the
findings of the Rand Corporation.
In addition to the problem of promoting the economic interests of
the broadcast industry, of equal importance in the development of
cable is the need for the education of the public. One reason for the
presently sad state of cable affairs is that originally both the FCC and
the courts based their findings on the premise that public interest was
high, and thus public usage and benefit would be proportionate. Un-
fortunately, this was not the situation.
With the advent of re-regulation, emphasis should be placed on in-
volving local municipalities and citizens. These are the groups that will
assure the advancement of the cable industry in a direction beneficial
to the originally posed justifications for FCC regulation. These are the
groups that will keep the economic interests of the broadcast industry
in check. This way, cable will serve the majority of the people.
SHEILA TABRON
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